The Price of Isolation: Estimating the Ecosystem Cost of Symmetric Two-Sided A/B Testing

On two-sided content platforms, symmetric two-sided isolation (assigning matched fractions of creators and viewers to isolated treatment and control submarkets) is widely used for creator-side and cold-start experiments because it removes cross-arm marketplace interference. Isolation, however, thins each viewer's candidate catalog, and intuition suggests the resulting engagement cost should fade as the platform grows: a small fraction of a vast catalog is still vast. We show that, in an order-statistics model of engagement, whether this intuition holds depends on the upper tail of match quality. Extreme-value theory yields tail-class loss laws with a sharp dichotomy: for light or bounded tails the loss vanishes as the candidate pool grows, whereas under heavy tails it converges to a size-independent constant, so expanding the candidate pool, even by orders of magnitude, does not asymptotically eliminate the cost. Evidence from two production experiments on a platform with millions of active creators is consistent with this picture: a pure A/A traffic sweep reveals a measurable, depth-graded engagement cost; a one-sided catalog ablation independently shows that per-viewer thinning contributes to the loss; and a tail index calibrated on the small exploration pool predicts an effect consistent with the one observed in the far larger full-catalog ablation. Isolation thus carries a price that experimenters should budget for, like any other cost. We give practitioners a preflight procedure that estimates it before launch, sizes traffic accordingly, and recommends a fallback design when the predicted cost exceeds a chosen tolerance.

Data-Driven Dynamic Assortment in Online Platforms: Learning about Two Sides

We study a dynamic assortment problem on a two-sided service platform with incomplete information and heterogeneous customers in a discrete-time setting. In each period, a customer arrives seeking service, and the platform chooses an assortment of sellers to display. The customer then proposes a transaction to at most one seller in the assortment according to a multinomial logit choice model. After a fixed number of periods, sellers review the proposals they have received and each chooses at most one customer according to another multinomial logit choice model, after which the cycle repeats. A key challenge is that the platform does not know the choice-model parameters of either customers or sellers in advance. To our knowledge, this is the first study of a dynamic assortment problem in which both sides' choice parameters are unknown. We develop a data-driven algorithm that learns these parameters while optimizing the platform's objective over time. We evaluate performance using regret, which measures revenue loss relative to a clairvoyant benchmark that knows all parameters and customer arrivals in advance. We show that the algorithm's worst-case regret grows polylogarithmically over time, and we derive a matching lower bound, establishing its rate optimality.