Policy-aware Vector Search: A Vision for Fine Grained Access Control in Vector Databases

Vector databases are increasingly used in security sensitive contexts with Retrieval Augmented Generation and organizational AI pipelines; however, their security capabilities remain limited. Specifically, Fine-grained Access Control (FGAC) which is required to ensure that data access adheres to user-specific policies is not fully supported in modern vector databases. Unlike relational databases, vector databases combine structured and unstructured attributes to provide semantic, approximate query results, which complicates FGAC implementation. This creates an inherent tension between enforcing FGAC policies correctly, achieving high ANN search recall and maintaining low query latency. In this paper, we present a vision for Policy-aware Vector Search by formalizing the FGAC policy model in vector databases as well as the enforcement problem. We compare various enforcement strategies, present preliminary findings, and identify key open challenges for future research in policy-aware vector search.

Ghost Vectors: Soft-Deleted Embeddings Remain Reconstructible in HNSW Vector Databases

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) allows large language models to access external and private corpora for factual, domain-specific responses. Modern RAG pipelines use hierarchical navigable small world (HNSW) vector databases for efficient similarity search. When a user requests data deletion, the systems typically only mark the record as deleted, leaving the embedding on disk physically unchanged. This soft-delete operation raises compliance concerns under data-erasure and retention requirements such as GDPR Article 17 and HIPAA. Analysis on three HNSW implementations confirms that deleted vectors remain physically recoverable by accessing the raw index files at the storage layer, bypassing API access. Using the Vec2Text inversion model without domain-specific fine-tuning, we show this vulnerability on multiple real-world datasets and data modalities. On Wikipedia biographical living persons dataset (BLP), we successfully recover 25.5% of exact person names and 46.4% of geographic locations (ROUGE-L 0.185). Recovery reaches 100% for both patient age and gender markers (ROUGE-L 0.290) on highly structured, sensitive data (NIH Synthea dataset). On soft-deleted image embeddings, we show 100% tissue classification on histopathology patches (p=1.02e-07) and top-1 identity recovery reaches 99% on facial embeddings (p<0.01). This work introduces Epoch Key Rotation, which encrypts vectors and discards the key upon deletion. Epoch key rotation reduces observed PII recovery to 0% and completes in 2.5 ms for 500 deleted vectors (approximately 0.005 ms/record). Additionally, it generates an ECDSA-signed cryptographic proof as an auditable record of the deletion event.

What Limits Does Quantization Place on Dense Top-$k$ Retrieval? A Theoretical Study

We establish conditions for embedding a corpus of $N$ documents as $d$-dimensional vectors such that every $k$-subset $S \subseteq [N]$ is realizable as a result of top-$k$ retrieval by some query vector. Recent work shows that $d = O(k)$ suffices for such embeddings to exist in $\mathbb{R}^d$, independently of $N$. We theoretically prove that this corpus-independent bound is specific to infinite precision. With $B$ bits per coordinate, perfect top-$k$ retrieval requires $Bd = Ω(k \ln N)$; thus, at any fixed precision, the dimension must grow at least logarithmically with $N$. Specializing to a $\ell_2$-normalized $B$-bit uniform scalar quantization model, we also identify a threshold on the precision $B^{*} = O(\ln \ln N)$ below which no dimension suffices, together with two further regimes that bound the feasible $(B, d)$ pairs. Our result implies that in practical vector databases and dense retrieval systems where quantization is standard, the embedding dimension and possibly the precision must grow with the corpus size.