Coverage Is Not Containment: A Fundamental Limit of Admission-Time Defenses Against Coordinated Poisoning of Vector Retrieval

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) answers a question by retrieving passages from a vector store and trusting them as context, so anyone who can add documents can try to steer the answer. A recent, appealing defense filters poisoning at ingestion, rejecting any document that behaves like a hub. We show it -- and every ingestion-time filter -- is defeated by a coordinated adversary that injects a handful of individually unremarkable documents which together surround one target query and seize its top-k (on BGE-large / BEIR, m=10 documents take 10/10; 9.9/10 on a live HNSW index). The attack is not theoretical. Realized as ordinary fluent text and run end-to-end through a BGE-large + HNSW + Qwen2.5-7B pipeline, it makes the generator emit the attacker's planted claim in 88% of targets, versus 0% without the injection. And no admission-time defense stops it: at ingestion an attack cone is geometrically identical to a legitimate niche upload, so -- measuring this directly -- the strongest trained classifier, given every feature and thousands of examples, separates the two no better than chance, catching 4.2% of attacks at a 1% false-positive rate. We prove this limit for the entire class of ingestion-time statistics (any decision from documents and reference queries alone), and it reproduces -- and worsens -- across two corpora and five encoders. The one signal that separates an attack from legitimate niche ingestion -- a query's demand -- is invisible before retrieval, which is also the escape: a retrieval-time detector that observes demand catches 100% of the attacks at the same 1% false-positive rate. Coverage of the query space by an admission gate is not containment of coordinated poisoning; robust defense must move past the front door, to demand.

TurboVec: A Case Study in Cost-Efficient Private Retrieval for Enterprise RAG via Codebook-Oblivious Quantization

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems increasingly power enterprise LLM applications, yet the vector retrieval layer introduces two underexplored challenges: (1) trained codebook quantizers may expose corpus statistics during index construction, creating a leakage channel in multi-tenant deployments, and (2) post-hoc filtering for tenant isolation degrades recall on selective queries. We study TurboVec, an open-source vector index built on TurboQuant - a codebook-oblivious scalar quantizer requiring no corpus-dependent training. On the DBpedia OpenAI embeddings benchmark (d=1536, 100K-999K vectors), TurboQuant 4-bit outperforms trained FAISS Product Quantization at the same memory budget by 8.5-8.9 percentage points in Recall@5 across all scales. Compared to HNSW (R@5=0.991) and IVF-PQ (R@5=0.840), TurboQuant occupies a distinct design point: higher recall than IVF-PQ without training, at 4-8x less memory than HNSW. Deployed on Snowpark Container Services, TurboVec achieves 11ms median query latency at 100K vectors versus 707ms for warehouse brute-force scan. Kernel-level allowlist filtering maintains 0.86-0.93 Recall@10 across 10-1000 tenant workloads versus 0.09-0.19 for post-filter baselines. Codebook-oblivious design reduces membership inference accuracy to near-random (50.0%) versus 57.3% for PQ codebooks. Limitations include single dataset evaluation, uncompressed HNSW comparison, and privacy evaluation on synthetic data only.

Hybrid privacy-aware semantic search: SVD-truncated document geometry and CKKS-encrypted query reranking under a restricted threat model

Semantic search creates an asymmetric disclosure problem: query embeddings may reveal user intent, while returning exact provider vectors distributes reusable representations. We evaluate a deliberately restricted hybrid design. A public corpus-fitted SVD basis and PQ index support client-side candidate selection; candidate IDs are disclosed, while the projected query is encrypted with CKKS. A block-SIMD kernel scores 100 plaintext provider vectors and returns one ciphertext. At 672 dimensions, median server time falls from 1689.1 to 224.5 ms and response size by a factor of 99.5; provider-only saturation reaches 25.99 requests/s with 16 workers. In a frozen post-exploratory revision-analysis subset, disjoint from validation and containing 3,235 canonical BEIR queries, five of six collections satisfy a +/-0.002 nDCG@10 equivalence rule between actual CKKS and plaintext reranking of the same shortlist, while ArguAna is inconclusive. Projection controls favor SVD over random and coordinate truncation. Leakage audits show that disclosed candidate sets are highly linkable and reproduce part of the exact neighbourhood, while public PQ reveals approximate corpus geometry. The design therefore conditionally hides numerical query slots, but does not provide semantic-query, document, unlinkability, circuit, or access-pattern privacy.