Modernizing legacy Fortran is a problem of volume: the transformations are individually routine, but the codebases can be enormous, and across much of computational science the work simply goes undone. We propose an agentic workflow that takes this work on at production scale, and we set out to measure how far such delegation can reach. In this work, three prompt-specialized agent roles operate under a version-controlled specification that the agents themselves authored and revised, while humans hold a small number of gates. The arrangement is kept safe by an exact verification oracle inherited from the domain, and the boundary of safe delegation lies exactly where that oracle stops seeing. We apply the proposed workflow in a case study, converting the two-electron-integral routines of GAMESS (General Atomic and Molecular Electronic Structure System), a mature quantum-chemistry package with a 48-year development history, from fixed-form Fortran 77 to free-form Fortran 2008. The scope of this work was twelve source files, 56,448 lines, and 225 subroutines for computing electron repulsion integrals. The agents ran as three Claude Code roles in isolated worktrees, and the work spanned four Claude model generations. Because the GAMESS group ships a standard test suite whose printed energies its user community treats as canonical, we could adopt bit-for-bit reproduction of those energies as the merge criterion, where a deviation in the twelfth decimal place counts as a failure rather than drift. All twelve source files pass a 51-test validation battery comprising the 49 standard GAMESS tests and two additional calculations, and across 612 test runs the number of chemistry-relevant differences is zero, and every file also passes the Jenkins tests that are used for continuous integration.
Issam Seddik, Sami Souihi, Mohamed Tamaazousti +1cs.CR cs.LG
Backdoor attacks severely threaten large-scale AI models. When model owners delegate training to external compute providers within a decentralized training paradigm, adversaries can craft stealthy, low-frequency triggers to inject malicious behavior while evading standard audits. Traditionally, detecting these attacks requires a full re-computation of the training steps--a prohibitive overhead that directly contradicts the owner's resource constraints. To address this, we investigate the resilience of continuous optimization dynamics under Byzantine perturbations, where adversaries are forced to compete against a continuous influx of honest updates. Under a threat model where an adversary compromises f out of n total trainers, we quantify the minimum auditing overhead required by the model owner to probabilistically bound the attack success rate. We formalize this injection-absorption dynamic as a Discrete-Time Markov Chain (DTMC). Using this framework, we prove that the success probability of any bounded adversary asymptotically collapses to zero under a defense strategy combining natural absorption, a randomized scheduler, and lazy verification oracle. Empirical results demonstrate significant backdoor suppression with zero utility degradation even when invoking the verification oracle on merely 10% of the total training steps. This approach yields a provably sound and computationally efficient defense for safety-critical AI.