Agentic commerce is moving from concept to deployed infrastructure: payment networks, retailers, and AI platforms are setting the stage for agents to transact on behalf of merchants and consumers. Yet whether the LLMs behind these agents can price competently in real markets, where customer preferences are hidden, competitors adapt in real time, and demand can shift without warning, has not been systematically tested. We introduce Bazaar, a dynamic sealed-bid benchmark for multi-attribute auction under these conditions. Despite its dynamics, the benchmark is grounded in closed-form customer utilities, enabling exact evaluation. Across 11 frontier LLMs from four providers, the leading agents on customer acquisition (e.g. Gemini 3.1 Pro) are often not the leading agents on profit (e.g. Opus 4.6). The ranking shifts again under demand shocks: agents that learned fastest pre-shock are typically the slowest to revise their beliefs afterwards, while Gemini 3.1 Pro recovers fastest despite not leading on profit. However, even the strongest agent captures less than a third of hindsight-optimal profit, suggesting current LLMs are progressing in agentic commerce but leave substantial headroom.
Adrian de Valois-Franklin, Alex Bogdancs.AI cs.CR cs.MA
Autonomous agents negotiate, purchase, deploy code, and move funds, but no neutral mechanism determines whether they met their delegated obligation, who is responsible when they did not, or which settlement action follows. This is the agentic clearing problem. Tool protocols (MCP), inter-agent communication (A2A), payment rails (x402), mandate and network agent protocols (AP2, Visa, Mastercard), and settlement-risk standards each assume that determination and none produce it. Clearing is the missing primitive. Payment is not clearing. Authorization is not clearing. LLM-as-judge evaluation is not clearing. Settlement-risk escrow is not clearing: it consumes clearing decisions. RAILS (Real-Time Agent Integrity & Ledger Settlement) is the integrity and clearing layer for agentic commerce, spanning a per-output reliability score, a published reliability record, and a clearing function that consumes them. The clearing protocol at its core closes that gap. Seven primitives (Obligation Object, Evidence Envelope, Verification Mesh, Clearing Decision, Settlement Instruction, Clearing Passport, Finality Rules), bound by a formal model of admissibility-graded verification, together yield a soundness property: no financially material settlement is supported by evidence below the obligation's admissibility floor. The property is falsifiable against the spec. We are not aware of a prior agent-commerce verification mechanism that states a property of this kind. The approaches nearest to it emit a pass, a delivery guarantee, a bare score, or an equilibrium. This paper specifies that clearing protocol.