Agents That Model Agents: Five Principles Toward a Theory of Mind for 6G Networks

Future 6G networks will rely on Large Language Model (LLM) agents to manage the Radio Access Network (RAN). However, current architectures assume inter-agent messages convey objective facts. A message is instead a \emph{trace} of the sender's reasoning: it carries a subjective conclusion, so a syntactically valid report can propagate an AI hallucination and trigger a cascading outage invisible to protocol validation. Reading such a trace requires a Theory of Mind (ToM)---before acting, the receiver must model what the peer believes, and what a peer in that position should have believed. Modeling these interactions as cognitive channels on a cellular sheaf, we obtain a unified framework for resilient multi-agent systems, from which five design principles emerge: (i) a message is evidence of the sender's hidden reasoning; (ii) trust is a continuous cognitive Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR)---asserted precision over deviation from the modeled peer belief; (iii) network-wide consistency and resistance to hallucination contagion are computable via the sheaf's Laplacian; (iv) peer-modeling must halt at exactly two levels to conserve compute and survive mutual information decay; and (v) credible capacity is bounded by operational goal alignment, not link bandwidth. A signaling-storm study on locally deployed 1B-parameter telecom language models validates it: cognitive SNR isolates a hallucinating peer that three of its four neighbors agree with, where a divergence gate ranks every wrong peer above the right one; only depth two ToM recovers the correct action; and the spectral gap decides whether a topology reaches consistency inside the near-real-time budget.

Assessing mentalization in humans and large language models

Mentalization - the ability to infer others' beliefs and intentions to guide one's own choices - is a key cognitive function underlying human social interactions. Large language models (LLMs) demonstrate behaviour consistent with humans on theory-of-mind tasks, yet whether these models can guide adaptive behaviour through mentalization is unknown. Here we use two economic games with cognitive computational modeling to uncover the latent strategies underlying mentalization in LLMs. We tested individual LLM agents across four model families, DeepSeek, GPT-4.1, GPT-5 and Gemini 2.0 Flash (N = 2,099), against opponents of varying sophistication and examined whether a prompting strategy designed to elicit strategic reasoning improved performance. We benchmarked results against human participants (N = 251) as a comparative measure. Across both games, LLMs showed clear behavioural and computational signatures of mentalizing that differed markedly by model provider and size. Strategic prompting generally improved performance by inducing more sophisticated reasoning, yet the extent of the benefit differed across the two tasks. Last, GPT-5 agents flexibly adapted their recursive depth of reasoning to increasingly sophisticated opponents, demonstrating superior performance to human participants. Collectively, we demonstrate different capacities for mentalization across LLMs, and highlight cognitive computational modeling as a formal method for assessing comparative intelligence across humans and machines.

From Passive Delegates to Strategic Negotiators: Reinforcing Social Reasoning in Small Language Models with SocialRL

AI agents increasingly act on their users' behalf, handling tasks such as scheduling meetings, comparing offers, and haggling over prices. These principal-driven tasks routinely place the agent across from a counterpart (another user's agent, a seller, a recruiter) whose goals may conflict with its principal's. Yet the dispositions that make an assistant pleasant can make it a poor delegate: a friendly, helpful frontier model may disclose its principal's private information unprompted and concede at the first sign of resistance. We present SocialRL, a general recipe that trains social reasoning directly, and apply it to a 4B model across six domains: Deal-or-No-Deal, CaSiNo, Craigslist, Job Interview, Calendar, and Marketplace. Every domain is trained in-domain under the same recipe, and every policy is evaluated on all six. We find that (1) in-domain training reaches the frontier: on held-out scenarios the 4B matches or exceeds the GPT-5 family per domain, closing 73-122% of the baseline-to-frontier gap on the negotiation games, with 78% of buyer openings anchoring below target versus 3% untrained; (2) cross-domain transfer follows game structure: structurally paired games lift each other, a broad multi-issue donor lifts nearly all domains, and structurally isolated games transfer nothing; (3) guided by this transfer structure, two strategies, cascade RL and multi-teacher on-policy distillation (OPD), consolidate the per-domain specialists into a single unified 4B that reaches 0.627 average utility across all six environments, matching or exceeding GPT-4.1 (0.625), GPT-5.1 (0.619), and GPT-5.2 (0.613); (4) an explicit theory-of-mind scaffold helps only through training: distilling the ToM trace, rather than actions alone, lifts utility on every environment and generalizes better across them, and of the two ToM skills, only next-action prediction predicts negotiation outcomes.

Avalon-ToM-Bench: Evaluating Fine-Grained Theory of Mind via Asymmetric Game Mechanics

Theory of Mind (ToM) is essential for agent interactions, yet existing evaluations either rely on static scenarios that oversimplify mental-state reasoning or interactive settings that provide limited diagnostic insight. We present Avalon-ToM-Bench, a fine-grained benchmark that operationalizes ToM through the asymmetric-information mechanics of The Resistance: Avalon. Rather than evaluating end-to-end gameplay, it decomposes ToM into a 2$\times$2 taxonomy -- epistemic versus motivational reasoning crossed with inference versus action -- using human-crafted, perspective-constrained queries. Benchmarking 28 LLMs reveals three insights: 1) Reasoning, not knowledge. Models show strong game-rule comprehension but markedly weaker ToM abilities, isolating failures to social reasoning rather than missing domain knowledge. 2) Expression, not representation. Mechanistic analyses via linear probing and activation steering show that models frequently represent correct mental-state inferences in their hidden states but fail to express them during generation -- linear probes recover 77-82% accuracy versus 62-70% from the models' own chain-of-thought. 3) Policy, not deliberation. Dedicated reasoning training yields substantial improvements whereas test-time chain-of-thought provides only marginal gains (+11.0 versus +1.1 points on average), suggesting that robust ToM depends on a learned reasoning policy rather than increased inference-time deliberation.

Theory of Mind and Persuasion Beyond Conversation: Assessing the Capacity of LLMs to Induce Belief States via Planning and Action

Theory of Mind (ToM) benchmarks for Large Language Models (LLMs) typically rely on passive question-answering formats, but the deployment of LLMs in increasingly agentic and autonomous forms demands new evaluations. In this paper we evaluate an agent's ability to induce specific belief states in other agents by taking actions rather than using conversational persuasion, a capability we call Non-Conversational Planning ToM (NCP-ToM). NCP-ToM is likely to be essential for many agent use-cases, including within user-assistant interactions and pedagogical contexts, but may also present manipulation or misinformation risks. Using a novel framework, NCP-ExploreToM, we subvert the conventional task structure by providing models with a set of belief state goals and requiring them to move objects or direct characters into rooms to achieve their goals. We evaluated six frontier models, including GPT-5, Gemini 2.5 Pro and the Claude 4 series, and a cohort of human participants, across 600 task instances. GPT-5 was successful on approximately 80% of tasks in the agentic setting, and was the only model to outperform human participants on our task, but was still less robust than humans across contexts. We additionally found that all models, like humans, performed better on tasks inducing true belief states than false belief states, which is a positive signal for alignment efforts. These findings highlight emerging social-reasoning capabilities in LLMs for non-conversational task completion and underscore the necessity of agentic evaluations for understanding the safety and alignment of autonomous social agents.

Triadic Werewolf: A Jester Role for Multi-Hop Theory of Mind in LLMs

Theory-of-mind evaluations of large language models typically use dyadic social-deduction games, where every observable cue points to a single hidden side, so a model with strong language priors can score well without ever simulating opponents' incentives. We extend the Werewolf game with a Jester, a third faction whose utility on peer suspicion is inverted because it wins by being voted out, so optimal play requires reasoning across three opposing utility functions. Across 60 games on GPT-4.1, DeepSeek-V3.1, and Llama-3.3-70B with Jester self-learning on and off, the Jester wins 60-70% of games while Werewolves never exceed 20%, and GPT-4.1 wolves vote the Jester out on day 1 in 60-70% of games, a strictly self-defeating action. Self-learning helps DeepSeek and Llama but hurts GPT-4.1, with the cost landing on Villagers rather than Werewolves. Only DeepSeek learns the subtle strategy of looking suspicious without looking intentionally suspicious, and it gains the most from the loop. Triadic incentive structure exposes a layer of multi-agent reasoning that dyadic deduction games leave invisible.

A Causal Model of Theory of Mind in Conflict for Artificial Intelligence

Theory of mind (ToM), the capacity to ascribe mental states to others and use those ascriptions for prediction and inference, is widely assumed to be essential for effective human-machine integration. Existing AI-ToM models address \emph{how} to mentalize, but leave the question of when largely unaddressed. The central question is: under what situational and agent-level conditions is ToM engagement causally warranted in conflict? This paper presents a structural causal model formalized as a directed acyclic graph (DAG), treating ToM as a mechanism activated by situational and agent-level conditions rather than as an always-on capacity. The model specifies four exogenous variables capturing situational and agent-level conditions, five endogenous mediators, and a mechanistic ToM node producing engagement states through three distinct causal pathways: a tractability pathway, a reasoning-depth pathway, and an enabling-cause pathway. The primary outcome is epistemic accuracy, which decouples social reasoning from behavioral policy and generalizes across social phenomena beyond conflict. The framework gives AI systems a principled, resource-rational decision procedure for mentalizing, with implications for efficiency, trust, and the development of robust artificial social intelligence. Simulation validation, empirical human-machine teaming studies, and ethical considerations arising from conflict-optimized mentalizing are discussed.