Hatim Chergui, Carolina Fernández-Martínez, Mehdi Bennis +1cs.NI cs.AI cs.MA
Future 6G networks will rely on Large Language Model (LLM) agents to manage the Radio Access Network (RAN). However, current architectures assume inter-agent messages convey objective facts. A message is instead a \emph{trace} of the sender's reasoning: it carries a subjective conclusion, so a syntactically valid report can propagate an AI hallucination and trigger a cascading outage invisible to protocol validation. Reading such a trace requires a Theory of Mind (ToM)---before acting, the receiver must model what the peer believes, and what a peer in that position should have believed. Modeling these interactions as cognitive channels on a cellular sheaf, we obtain a unified framework for resilient multi-agent systems, from which five design principles emerge: (i) a message is evidence of the sender's hidden reasoning; (ii) trust is a continuous cognitive Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR)---asserted precision over deviation from the modeled peer belief; (iii) network-wide consistency and resistance to hallucination contagion are computable via the sheaf's Laplacian; (iv) peer-modeling must halt at exactly two levels to conserve compute and survive mutual information decay; and (v) credible capacity is bounded by operational goal alignment, not link bandwidth. A signaling-storm study on locally deployed 1B-parameter telecom language models validates it: cognitive SNR isolates a hallucinating peer that three of its four neighbors agree with, where a divergence gate ranks every wrong peer above the right one; only depth two ToM recovers the correct action; and the spectral gap decides whether a topology reaches consistency inside the near-real-time budget.
Productive dialogue alignment requires distinguishing \emph{surface coordination} (acknowledgments and smooth task progression) from \emph{epistemic alignment} (convergence of belief states); standard preference-based methods typically optimize response-level preferences without explicitly modeling the latter. We operationalize Theory-of-Mind (ToM) inference as a control signal within Frictive Policy Optimization by extracting, at each referring expression, a four-part belief structure: the speaker's intended referent, the addressee's interpretation, and each participant's model of the other's belief. This makes friction mechanically computable from epistemic-state comparisons, capturing \emph{silent divergence}, where both participants proceed confidently while grounding to different referents. We evaluate the signal at two levels. At the representation level, ablating the second-order channel reduces misunderstanding recall from $65\%$ to $26\%$. At the policy level, reward-shaping (FAR) and trust-region (FTR) variants improve intervention F1 and warranted-context calibration over DPO, with Brier scores independently supporting the calibration gains. Across three training runs, FAR and FTR remain substantially more stable, whereas DPO varies widely and can degrade intervention competence already present in the base policy. Thus, ToM-grounded friction provides a trainable signal for context-sensitive intervention under referential belief divergence.
Mentalization - the ability to infer others' beliefs and intentions to guide one's own choices - is a key cognitive function underlying human social interactions. Large language models (LLMs) demonstrate behaviour consistent with humans on theory-of-mind tasks, yet whether these models can guide adaptive behaviour through mentalization is unknown. Here we use two economic games with cognitive computational modeling to uncover the latent strategies underlying mentalization in LLMs. We tested individual LLM agents across four model families, DeepSeek, GPT-4.1, GPT-5 and Gemini 2.0 Flash (N = 2,099), against opponents of varying sophistication and examined whether a prompting strategy designed to elicit strategic reasoning improved performance. We benchmarked results against human participants (N = 251) as a comparative measure. Across both games, LLMs showed clear behavioural and computational signatures of mentalizing that differed markedly by model provider and size. Strategic prompting generally improved performance by inducing more sophisticated reasoning, yet the extent of the benefit differed across the two tasks. Last, GPT-5 agents flexibly adapted their recursive depth of reasoning to increasingly sophisticated opponents, demonstrating superior performance to human participants. Collectively, we demonstrate different capacities for mentalization across LLMs, and highlight cognitive computational modeling as a formal method for assessing comparative intelligence across humans and machines.
Tonglin Yan, Gregoire Sergeant-Perthuis, David Rudraufcs.AI
Effective social interaction requires agents to translate mental state inferences into coordinated behavioral signals across verbal and nonverbal channels simultaneously. Yet existing benchmarks evaluate theory of mind (ToM) reasoning and embodied behavior in isolation, leaving unmeasured the gap between social inference and social action. We introduce MOSAIC (Multimodal Orchestration of Social Action, Inference, and Communication), a controlled benchmark in which two embodied agents interact across cooperative and competitive scenarios requiring integration of verbal statements, spatial trajectories, gaze direction, and facial expression under systematically varied ToM constraints. Evaluating 13 models, including 11 VLMs, across 200 trials per model, we find that VLMs fail to produce behaviors consistent with the expected outcomes under ToM-order constraints, and that imposing explicit ToM-order constraints produces no reliable behavioral change aligned with the specified reasoning level. Signal-level analysis reveals two sequential bottlenecks: most models cannot produce directionally coherent nonverbal signals, and even when signals are present, VLM agents fail to interpret others behaviors and react to them. PCM-LLM, included as a structured architectural reference point with an explicit ToM module, succeeds across all conditions, suggesting that explicit belief-action coupling is a sufficient ingredient for this class of tasks.
AI agents increasingly act on their users' behalf, handling tasks such as scheduling meetings, comparing offers, and haggling over prices. These principal-driven tasks routinely place the agent across from a counterpart (another user's agent, a seller, a recruiter) whose goals may conflict with its principal's. Yet the dispositions that make an assistant pleasant can make it a poor delegate: a friendly, helpful frontier model may disclose its principal's private information unprompted and concede at the first sign of resistance. We present SocialRL, a general recipe that trains social reasoning directly, and apply it to a 4B model across six domains: Deal-or-No-Deal, CaSiNo, Craigslist, Job Interview, Calendar, and Marketplace. Every domain is trained in-domain under the same recipe, and every policy is evaluated on all six. We find that (1) in-domain training reaches the frontier: on held-out scenarios the 4B matches or exceeds the GPT-5 family per domain, closing 73-122% of the baseline-to-frontier gap on the negotiation games, with 78% of buyer openings anchoring below target versus 3% untrained; (2) cross-domain transfer follows game structure: structurally paired games lift each other, a broad multi-issue donor lifts nearly all domains, and structurally isolated games transfer nothing; (3) guided by this transfer structure, two strategies, cascade RL and multi-teacher on-policy distillation (OPD), consolidate the per-domain specialists into a single unified 4B that reaches 0.627 average utility across all six environments, matching or exceeding GPT-4.1 (0.625), GPT-5.1 (0.619), and GPT-5.2 (0.613); (4) an explicit theory-of-mind scaffold helps only through training: distilling the ToM trace, rather than actions alone, lifts utility on every environment and generalizes better across them, and of the two ToM skills, only next-action prediction predicts negotiation outcomes.
Theory of Mind (ToM) is essential for agent interactions, yet existing evaluations either rely on static scenarios that oversimplify mental-state reasoning or interactive settings that provide limited diagnostic insight. We present Avalon-ToM-Bench, a fine-grained benchmark that operationalizes ToM through the asymmetric-information mechanics of The Resistance: Avalon. Rather than evaluating end-to-end gameplay, it decomposes ToM into a 2$\times$2 taxonomy -- epistemic versus motivational reasoning crossed with inference versus action -- using human-crafted, perspective-constrained queries. Benchmarking 28 LLMs reveals three insights: 1) Reasoning, not knowledge. Models show strong game-rule comprehension but markedly weaker ToM abilities, isolating failures to social reasoning rather than missing domain knowledge. 2) Expression, not representation. Mechanistic analyses via linear probing and activation steering show that models frequently represent correct mental-state inferences in their hidden states but fail to express them during generation -- linear probes recover 77-82% accuracy versus 62-70% from the models' own chain-of-thought. 3) Policy, not deliberation. Dedicated reasoning training yields substantial improvements whereas test-time chain-of-thought provides only marginal gains (+11.0 versus +1.1 points on average), suggesting that robust ToM depends on a learned reasoning policy rather than increased inference-time deliberation.
Do frontier vision-language models present a coherent Theory-of-Mind (ToM) profile across tasks, matching the same human reference group, or does that profile fragment from one paradigm to the next? We evaluate a shared panel of nine frontier VLMs on two psychology-derived benchmarks: the Keysar Director Task (visual perspective-taking under egocentric interference) and the Frith-Happé animated triangles scored with the Castelli rubric (intention attribution from pure motion). On the Director Task, without chain-of-thought, the panel makes the egocentric error on 78\% of trials like children rather than adults; variation is substantial across models, and reasoning rescues several models. On the triangles, the panel under-attributes intention: its ToM profile sits more than three times closer to the high-functioning-autistic-adult (HF-ASD) mean than to the typical-development-adult (TD) mean, while Goal-Directed and Random stay near TD. No model is nearest TD on both tasks; the model that looks adult-like on the Director Task falls on the HF-ASD side on the triangles, and the most TD-like model on the triangles is child-like on the Director Task. We report group-level descriptions, not diagnostic labels for any model.
Comparative feedback, asking people which of two behaviors they prefer, has become a standard way to align robot and agent behavior with human intent when the reward itself cannot be specified directly. Preference-based reward learning typically casts the human teacher as a passive oracle answering learner-generated queries. We argue this forfeits the teacher's defining advantage: knowledge of the objective. A teacher who knows the target can construct training examples more efficiently than any learner-driven acquisition strategy, an advantage that widens as the reward's feature dimension grows. However, exploiting this advantage requires an accurate model of what the learner currently knows. We therefore recast preference learning as a human-autonomy team problem coupling two behavioral models: the teacher maintains a model of the learner to design an informative curriculum, and the learner maintains a second-order model of the teacher's model, emitting structured preference constraints (understanding statements) that keep the teacher's model of the learner synchronized. In simulation, an informed teacher outperforms learner-led selection; teacher-model drift under alternating teachers erodes this advantage; and understanding statements repair it, with second-order (ToM-2) statements outperforming mean-belief statements when the teacher's error about the learner is concentrated in a particular direction rather than spread evenly.
Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to infer other's beliefs, intentions, and states of knowledge, is central to social interaction, yet remains challenging for current Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs), especially in multi-party meetings where cues are distributed across speech and behavior. Existing multimodal ToM benchmarks mainly focus on video-grounded question answering over overt, externally verifiable signals, and provide limited coverage of latent social states and group dynamics. We introduce MeetingToM, a benchmark for complex social behavior reasoning in naturalistic multi-party meetings. MeetingToM targets meeting-specific phenomena such as \textbf{pseudo-consensus}, where apparent agreement masks private dissent under social pressure. The benchmark is hierarchically organized to evaluate ToM at increasing levels of social granularity, including (i) subject-level mental state prediction, (ii) dyadic-level addressee understanding, and (iii) group-level consensus reasoning. We provide a unified evaluation protocol and conduct systematic analyses of representative MLLMs, revealing persistent limitations in integrating non-verbal cues, inferring hidden attitudes, and distinguishing genuine consensus from pseudo-consensus. Our results highlight key challenges and establish MeetingToM as a testbed for advancing meeting-grounded ToM in multimodal models.
Roberta Rocca, Sami Boukortt, Geoff Keeling +1cs.CL cs.AI
Text-based evaluations of Theory of Mind (ToM) in Large Language Models (LLMs) often involve cognitive tests akin to the Sally-Anne task that can be gamed due to exposure to relevantly similar tasks in pre-training and do not obviously test models' functional ToM abilities in ways that generalize to naturalistic settings. To address these issues, we introduce the Epistemic Asymmetry Schelling Task (EAST), a two-player dialogue game designed to benchmark robust and generalizable ToM abilities. By requiring LLM-LLM dyads to independently converge on semantic Schelling points under varying states of epistemic transparency, we evaluate whether models can robustly apply ToM to achieve coordination. Our results reveal a significant capability gap in functional social reasoning, with only frontier models successfully navigating the varying epistemic demands of the tasks. Analysis of reasoning traces shows that coordination failures are primarily driven by epistemic tracking errors, such as conflating private knowledge with mutual knowledge. Despite high performance on traditional static benchmarks, our study shows that robust social reasoning and epistemic tracking remain a critical bottleneck, providing concrete targets for future LLM evaluation and development.
Oliver Steele, Jiangtao Wen, Yuxing Hancs.CL cs.LG
Capable language models hold what a character believes apart from what is true: told "Anna believes the cup is blue; in reality it is red," they answer blue about Anna and red about the world. Where in the computation does that separation live? We show it rests on two separable mechanisms at two positions. A generic value slot binds the attributed value. A router at the query position selects which frame, the character's belief or reality, a query reads out. Two routes fill the slot: an asserted belief, whose value the text supplies, binds in directly; a derived belief, whose value must be inferred from what the character could see, arrives by a visibility-gated lookback. A subspace trained on either route steers the other, and only the derived route depends on described visibility. The slot itself carries no belief-reality tag: intervening on it moves a reality readout as strongly as a belief one. The separation lives instead in a dissociated pair of routing subspaces, which flip a query between frames without injecting the donor's value. These results hold across three architectures, on stimuli de-confounded against theory-of-mind-benchmark shortcuts; the behavior itself emerges between 3B and 7B across five model families. This paper develops the single belief-reality axis in depth; a companion paper shows the same slot-and-router format is shared across the other non-actual contexts a sentence can open (counterfactual, fictional, temporal).
Ben Slater, Matteo G. Mecattaf, Lucy G. Cheke +2cs.CL
Theory of Mind (ToM) benchmarks for Large Language Models (LLMs) typically rely on passive question-answering formats, but the deployment of LLMs in increasingly agentic and autonomous forms demands new evaluations. In this paper we evaluate an agent's ability to induce specific belief states in other agents by taking actions rather than using conversational persuasion, a capability we call Non-Conversational Planning ToM (NCP-ToM). NCP-ToM is likely to be essential for many agent use-cases, including within user-assistant interactions and pedagogical contexts, but may also present manipulation or misinformation risks. Using a novel framework, NCP-ExploreToM, we subvert the conventional task structure by providing models with a set of belief state goals and requiring them to move objects or direct characters into rooms to achieve their goals. We evaluated six frontier models, including GPT-5, Gemini 2.5 Pro and the Claude 4 series, and a cohort of human participants, across 600 task instances. GPT-5 was successful on approximately 80% of tasks in the agentic setting, and was the only model to outperform human participants on our task, but was still less robust than humans across contexts. We additionally found that all models, like humans, performed better on tasks inducing true belief states than false belief states, which is a positive signal for alignment efforts. These findings highlight emerging social-reasoning capabilities in LLMs for non-conversational task completion and underscore the necessity of agentic evaluations for understanding the safety and alignment of autonomous social agents.
Recent work suggests that Large Language Models (LLMs) are sensitive to the belief states of agents described by text, as measured by the false belief task (FBT), yet persistent concerns of construct validity remain. We adopt a **developmental perspective**, tracing the pattern of mental state reasoning behavior -- and likely **preconditions** for this behavior -- across multiple training stages in the Olmo2 and Pythia language model suites. We find that above-chance FBT performance depends both on model size and sufficient training volume, emerges relatively late in pretraining, and is most improved by post-training interventions (SFT, DPO) in the condition most diagnostic of mentalizing (False Belief, Implicit). However, FBT performance is fragile: consistent with past work, the use of non-factive verbs (e.g., thinks) increases false belief attributions even in the True Belief condition. To contextualize these findings, we track the emergence of **situation modeling**: the ability to report on basic factual properties of a described scene. Situation modeling accuracy generally precedes and exceeds FBT accuracy, yet situational representations also prove surprisingly incoherent in certain respects: when asked about the knowledge states of the Antagonist agent -- who always knows the item's true location -- Olmo2 13b is consistently influenced both by the Target agent's knowledge state and the presence of non-factive verbs. Together, these results suggest that larger, sufficiently trained models build partially coherent situation models in a developmentally appropriate sequence, yet display surprising fragility -- highlighting the value of developmental and stress-testing approaches for evaluating LLM capabilities.
Theory-of-mind evaluations of large language models typically use dyadic social-deduction games, where every observable cue points to a single hidden side, so a model with strong language priors can score well without ever simulating opponents' incentives. We extend the Werewolf game with a Jester, a third faction whose utility on peer suspicion is inverted because it wins by being voted out, so optimal play requires reasoning across three opposing utility functions. Across 60 games on GPT-4.1, DeepSeek-V3.1, and Llama-3.3-70B with Jester self-learning on and off, the Jester wins 60-70% of games while Werewolves never exceed 20%, and GPT-4.1 wolves vote the Jester out on day 1 in 60-70% of games, a strictly self-defeating action. Self-learning helps DeepSeek and Llama but hurts GPT-4.1, with the cost landing on Villagers rather than Werewolves. Only DeepSeek learns the subtle strategy of looking suspicious without looking intentionally suspicious, and it gains the most from the loop. Triadic incentive structure exposes a layer of multi-agent reasoning that dyadic deduction games leave invisible.
Theory of mind (ToM), the capacity to ascribe mental states to others and use those ascriptions for prediction and inference, is widely assumed to be essential for effective human-machine integration. Existing AI-ToM models address \emph{how} to mentalize, but leave the question of when largely unaddressed. The central question is: under what situational and agent-level conditions is ToM engagement causally warranted in conflict? This paper presents a structural causal model formalized as a directed acyclic graph (DAG), treating ToM as a mechanism activated by situational and agent-level conditions rather than as an always-on capacity. The model specifies four exogenous variables capturing situational and agent-level conditions, five endogenous mediators, and a mechanistic ToM node producing engagement states through three distinct causal pathways: a tractability pathway, a reasoning-depth pathway, and an enabling-cause pathway. The primary outcome is epistemic accuracy, which decouples social reasoning from behavioral policy and generalizes across social phenomena beyond conflict. The framework gives AI systems a principled, resource-rational decision procedure for mentalizing, with implications for efficiency, trust, and the development of robust artificial social intelligence. Simulation validation, empirical human-machine teaming studies, and ethical considerations arising from conflict-optimized mentalizing are discussed.
Inferring others' beliefs requires more than reading surface signals; it requires tracking who told them what, in what order, and how credibly. The Theory of Mind Utility (ToM-U) formalizes this epistemic state inference problem at the computational level of analysis, specifying what mentalizing computes and why without commitment to algorithmic or neural implementation. ToM-U achieves this by constructing Local Epistemic World Models (LEWMs) -- directed typed graphs that represent agents, state nodes, and the epistemic relationships among them -- and evaluating discrete candidate LEWMs against observed behavior until one achieves sufficient confidence. Five formal definitions specify the LEWM structure, agent node properties including ordered information access history, a bounded proliferation mechanism for recursive mentalizing, three inference procedures, and a residue function that captures the structured trace left by failed mentalizing attempts. ToM-U differs from Bayesian Theory of Mind and adjacent formal accounts, which presuppose rather than derive belief states, and from simulation theory and theory-theory, which lack a formal apparatus for epistemic state inference. The architecture generates directional, falsifiable predictions about mentalizing failure that follow from structural properties of the model rather than auxiliary assumptions, and positions ToM-U as a domain-agnostic mechanism upstream of goal inference and other downstream social cognitive processes.
Theory of Mind (ToM) reasoning requires inferring agents' beliefs from partial and asymmetric observations, which remains an open challenge for LLMs. Existing prompting-based approaches improve ToM reasoning through observable-event filtering or temporal belief chains, without explicitly modeling nested beliefs. We introduce RecToM, an inference-time framework for ToM reasoning that models nested beliefs via recursive perspective construction. RecToM constructs each character perspective from the preceding character perspective along the character chain specified by the question, reducing higher-order belief questions to actual-world questions within the final constructed perspective. We further provide a KD45 analysis showing that RecToM's perspective construction induces a well-formed belief modality beyond simple event filtering. Experiments on ToM benchmarks, including Hi-ToM, Big-ToM, and FanToM, across multiple LLM backbones show that RecToM consistently outperforms recent advanced approaches, achieving state-of-the-art performance. Notably, RecToM reaches 100\% accuracy on Hi-ToM with GPT-5.4 and Qwen3.5, a benchmark requiring higher-order ToM reasoning.
This paper investigates whether one large language model can approximate the humor preferences of another in a controlled Cards Against Humanity-style task. Two models - GPT-4o as Czar and Claude Opus-4.5 as Player - are evaluated on a binary humor-selection task constructed so that success cannot follow from self-preference. A reflected-cell stability procedure isolates 244 hands on which the two models hold deterministic but opposite preferences, partitioned into a 97-hand context pool and a 147-hand held-out test pool. The Player is then evaluated across five graded conditions: default self-preference, generic Czar-modeling instruction, model-identified Czar, prior Czar selections, and prior Czar selections with rationales. This gradient is designed to separate two sources of improvement: framing effects, in which the Player is told to attend to a Czar without seeing any of the Czar's behavior, and direct behavioral evidence, in which the Player is shown the Czar's prior choices. Player accuracy increased from 0.7% in Condition 1 to 19.0% and 25.9% in the framing-only conditions, and then rose to 72.8% and 82.3% once behavioral evidence and rationales were provided. An omnibus Cochran's Q test and pairwise McNemar tests confirmed that each step in the gradient produced a significant improvement. The results indicate that role instruction and model identity yield only modest gains, while behavioral evidence - especially when accompanied by rationales - supports substantial cross-model preference modeling. The findings are interpreted as theory-of-mind-like behavior in an operational rather than representational sense: the Player shifts away from self-preference toward another agent's demonstrated preferences, without any claim about an underlying representation of mental states.
Theory of Mind (ToM) is a must-acquire skill for modern foundation model systems to operate effectively and safely in the real world. Recent works have explored honing ToM via post-training; however, we show that such progress is confounded by a pervasive "shortcut" issue: tasks can reach up to 99% accuracy by simply exploiting spurious causal correlations, leading to a false sense of ToM. Motivated by this, we first develop a framework to systematically examine ToM datasets for shortcuts and provide guidance for future development. We find that questions reducible to pure state tracking, such as "belief," are especially shortcut-prone compared to mind questions, such as "intention," where reasoning beyond tracking is required. Using four shortcut-free datasets across three ToM contexts, we then comprehensively study whether Reinforcement Fine-Tuning with verifiable rewards and explicit reasoning chains, called Thinking-RFT, elevates ToM beyond Supervised Fine-Tuning, or SFT. Our key findings are as follows. First, Thinking-RFT effectively improves ToM in all scenarios, with a 6% improvement over SFT, particularly in complex higher-order reasoning, with a 10% improvement over SFT, and multimodal cases, with a 7% improvement over SFT. It also generalizes notably better to unseen domains and higher-order queries while being more robust to counterfactuals. Second, ToM benefits specifically from the joint effect of reasoning and RL: Thinking-RFT outperforms Non-Thinking-RFT by 7% on average. Third, RFT works by learning to ground its reasoning on anchor cues, such as keywords and state changes, that correspond to causal factors. We believe our study is useful for developing effective and robust ToM post-training datasets and advancing critical ToM capabilities.
True general intelligence requires not only a model of the physical world but also a social world model: the capacity to infer how individual mental states interact and crystallize into group-level outcomes. Despite notable progress in individual-level Theory of Mind (ToM) reasoning, existing multimodal large language models fail at this broader task. Collective behavior emerges non-linearly from social tensions, conformity dynamics, and structural constraints, meaning it cannot be recovered by merely summing individual intentions. We present GroupToM-Bench, the first multimodal benchmark for group-level ToM, built around a causal chain spanning micro-level BDI states (belief, desire, intention), meso-level group tension and structural constraints, and macro-level outcome prediction and mechanistic attribution. To probe this full arc, we develop a seven-level cognitive audit framework. Experiments reveal a gap between current models and human baselines, highlighting a failure to process social structures and non-linear collective dynamics.
This paper proposes, for the first time, a rigorous formal definition of the concept of Machine Theory of Mind, based on principles supported by evidence from cognitive psychology, neuroscience and artificial intelligence, and uses the above as a lens to examine state-of-the-art and current efforts in the field, driving a potential agenda for further research there able to "crack" the problem. It also advances a general holistic meta-model for Machine Theory of Mind, and examines the state of the art when it comes to empirically benchmarking such models.
Matteo Da Pelo, Alessio Donvito, Claudio Frongia +2cs.AI
We introduce a framework called LAPITHS (Language model Analysis through Paradigm grounded Interpretations of Theses about Human likenesS) and use it to show that several major claims advanced by models such as CENTAUR, proposed as an artificial Unified Model of Cognition, are not theoretically or empirically justified. LAPITHS provides a principled reference point for counteracting the current behaviouristic tendency in AI research to interpret the human level performances of transformer based language models as evidence of human like underlying computation and, by extension, as signs of cognitive abilities. The novelty of LAPITHS lies in making explicit the arguments grounded in two quantitative assessments: (i) the Minimal Cognitive Grid, a theoretically motivated method for estimating the cognitive plausibility of artificial systems, and (ii) a behavioural comparison showing that results similar to those reported for CENTAUR like models can be reproduced by other systems that do not satisfy the structural constraints typically associated with cognitive plausibility, and whose outputs do not provide independent explanatory insight into human cognition.