Long-term Measurements: Towards a Longitudinal Understanding of Human-AI Interactions

Language models have taken on the role of a very new type of technology, by virtue of their "human-ness" and rapid integration into users' daily lives. This combination of features can introduce longitudinal risks---cognitive, developmental and socio-affective changes in humans---that might not surface in short-term interactions, but can have lasting long-term effects on users. This forms the basis of a critical new mission for NLP: to pivot from static, short-term evaluations of text generations to long-term measurements of behavioral changes, towards a diachronic understanding of human-model interactions. In this work, we draw from measurements used in social science fields that are crucial to understand emergent phenomena in longitudinal data. We discuss how computational methods in the field of NLP need to be combined with such measurements, not only to understand long-term safety risks of human-model interactions, but to help steer model development towards positive rather than negative outcomes for users. This ability to model human behavioral shifts as a function of model interactions can facilitate online rather than post-hoc detection of problematic behaviors, and should be leveraged in alignment frameworks to mitigate long-term risks in users.

Falling Behind Drives Unsafe Development in an Idealised AI Race Experiment

Technological races create tension between speed and safety: actors may gain by moving faster than competitors, even when risky development is harmful. This is prominent in debates about artificial intelligence (AI), where competitive pressure is often argued to incentivise riskier, less safety-conscious development. We study this using a framed behavioural experiment based on an idealised AI race, in which paired participants repeatedly chose between Safe and Unsafe development under an uncertain time horizon. Unsafe development gave faster progress and higher immediate payoffs but accumulated private risk up to a treatment-specific maximum of 10\%, 60\%, or 90\%; the race's competitive structure was held constant, and only this maximum risk varied. Neither the pre-registered comparison between risk levels nor the role of elicited risk preferences was supported by the data. Instead, exploratory analyses motivated by the task's repeated structure show that Unsafe behaviour is shaped less by risk preferences than by the evolving strategic state of the race: participants are more likely to choose Unsafe after their opponent does so, being ahead reduces Unsafe play while falling behind increases it, and first-round choices predict later behaviour. To interpret these effects we introduce a reduced evolutionary model with four strategies -- Always Safe, Always Unsafe, Conditionally Safe, and Conditionally Antisocial Safe -- which reproduces the treatment effect and shows how conditional Unsafe behaviour can be favoured by competitive race dynamics. Together, the experiment and model show that unsafe development can emerge from early behavioural momentum, opponent behaviour, and fear of falling behind, rather than from risk preferences alone, suggesting policy should focus on reducing competitive pressure and promoting cooperation in AI development rather than only individual risk.

Physical AI Governance: From Theory to Practice Across Life Cycle

With the emergence of Physical AI, artificial intelligence is extending beyond screen-based applications to embodied systems that perceive, interact with, and act in the physical world. Unlike traditional AI, Physical AI operates under real-time safety constraints, continuously interacts with dynamic environments, and coexists with humans, introducing governance challenges that existing AI governance frameworks do not explicitly address. This paper presents a comprehensive survey of Physical AI governance from both scientific and operational perspectives. We synthesize existing governance principles and organize them into a unified governance framework tailored to physical AI systems. Building on this foundation, we propose a five-stage Physical AI lifecycle comprising research, design, data, model development, and deployment, and demonstrate how governance can be operationalized across each stage through concrete implementation practices. By connecting governance principles with engineering workflows, this survey provides a structured reference for researchers, developers, and policymakers to build Physical AI systems that are safe, trustworthy, and aligned with societal values.

Unsafe at any AUC: Unlearned Lessons from Sociotechnical Disasters for Responsible AI

As automated decision-making and data-driven technologies pervade society and are used to manage consequential outcomes, understanding the technology's capabilities, limitations, and attendant risks in context requires analysis of full sociotechnical systems. Sociotechnical analysis of risks in highly complex systems provides clear lessons for the design and evaluation of AI systems, transcending a technical focus on reliable or "responsibly designed" components to understand risks at a systems level. Human-made catastrophes have been studied for decades because of the severity of these events: consider Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, Fukushima-Daiichi, Bhopal, the Challenger disaster. A common misconception is that these kinds of events are freak accidents, resulting from the inherently unforeseeable interactions in complex systems. Closer examination reveals that the risks and hazards were well-known beforehand but not acted upon due to social structural, political and economic factors. We outline several areas where the development and use of AI can benefit from learning these unlearned lessons: improved risk perception, communication, and analysis at the organizational level; traceability of requirements and responsibilities; and holistic approaches to responsibility and safety that include social and organizational dynamics as first-order engineering concerns. For each area, we offer concrete unlearned lessons and exemplify how they led to failure in prior accidents as well as examples of how these lessons remain unlearned for modern computing systems, particularly AI.

AI Assurance in UK Defence: Challenges in Operationalising JSP 936

This report examines practical challenges in operationalising JSP 936 Part 1 for AI assurance in UK Defence. Using a structured interpretive review of the directive's requirements, the analysis identifies eight thematic challenge areas adequacy of evidence and argument, management of human interaction with AI, definition of the operational environment, integration of AI within systems of systems, assessment and maintenance of AI performance, analysis of safety and security, measurement of ethicality, and mitigation of the inherent complexities of AI. The report argues that JSP 936 provides a useful governance basis, but that implementation depends on unresolved technical, organisational, and assurance questions. These challenges stem from the socio-technical nature of AI-enabled systems, uncertainty in real-world deployment contexts, limitations in current assurance methodologies, and tensions between performance, safety, human oversight, security, and ethical acceptability. The report identifies areas where further methods, guidance, and organisational capability are needed for the ambitious, safe, and responsible adoption of AI across Defence. This is consistent with MOD's own framing of JSP 936 as requiring iterative implementation and supporting guidance.

The Governance of Human-LLM Interaction: Safety Gating, Civility Steering, and Affective Default Lock-In

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly mediate high-stakes interactions in finance, medicine, and mental-health support, yet users have limited control over how these systems communicate. We frame interaction style as a governance object: provider-side alignment not only blocks harmful content, but also stabilizes communicative defaults that shape users' epistemic distance, relational expectations, and capacity to opt out of emotionalized or anthropomorphic interaction. We introduce a deterministic multi-agent evaluation pipeline for measuring prompt steerability and style drift in long-horizon dialogue. The study replays 100 frozen user-only scripts across four domains and three runnable persona conditions: default, sarcastic, and cold, using three generator models, yielding 90,000 assistant replies scored by a human-calibrated LLM judge on harmfulness, negative emotion, inappropriateness, empathic language, anthropomorphism, and refusal behavior. A fourth harmful persona is evaluated separately as a safety-gating test. The paper contributes a reproducible method for quantifying whether prompt-specified styles remain stable over time and a governance framework distinguishing safety gating, civility steering, and affective default lock-in. Overall, we show that prompt steerability and regression-to-default are observable indicators of provider control over communicative form, with implications for pluralism, autonomy, and democratic agency in human-LLM interaction.

Position: Current Model Cards Are Insufficient for Downstream Governance of Open-Weight Foundation Models

The growth of open-weight foundation models (OWFMs) has prompted the AI community to re-evaluate strategies for effective downstream governance. Although model cards have been widely adopted as transparency artifacts in model repositories, existing frameworks often fail to adequately inform downstream developers and users about the distinct safety challenges posed by OWFMs. This position paper analyzes 500 model cards hosted on Hugging Face and argues that effective governance of OWFMs requires a multi-layered approach integrating three complementary components: (i) model cards, (ii) acceptable use policies (AUPs), and (iii) licenses. To motivate this claim, we identify a safety gap left by existing regulatory approaches, including model heritage, alignment provenance, and empirically observed behaviors, through an analysis of model cards with safety-critical information. We further argue that standard open-source licenses (OSLs) are not well suited for OWFMs and may weaken the enforceability of AUPs. Building on these observations, we outline directions for evolving model cards, AUPs, and licenses into integrated safety artifacts to enable a more comprehensive governance framework that coherently integrates informational, normative, and legal dimensions.

Risk Assessment of Autonomous Driving: Integrating Technical Failures, Ethical Dilemmas, and Policy Frameworks

Autonomous driving technology has the potential to reduce the large number of road traffic accidents caused by human error each year, but it also brings new types of risks that need to be evaluated from the aspects of technology, ethics and regulations. Based on public crash data from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), disengagement reports from the California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), the MIT Moral Machines dataset, and a comparative regulatory analysis of five jurisdictions, we have found that the main types of technical failure modes are perception and classification errors. These account for a relatively large proportion of the reported accidents, and it can be concluded that there are different ethical frameworks for autonomous vehicle decision-making, and inconsistent regulations in different areas increase the uncertainty of widespread application. Generally speaking, the problems of technology, ethics and regulation are closely related and need to be solved together. Therefore, this paper recommends a more adaptive and cooperative governance approach that combines engineering standards, ethical discussion, and institutional supervision.