Tonglin Yan, Gregoire Sergeant-Perthuis, David Rudraufcs.AI
Effective social interaction requires agents to translate mental state inferences into coordinated behavioral signals across verbal and nonverbal channels simultaneously. Yet existing benchmarks evaluate theory of mind (ToM) reasoning and embodied behavior in isolation, leaving unmeasured the gap between social inference and social action. We introduce MOSAIC (Multimodal Orchestration of Social Action, Inference, and Communication), a controlled benchmark in which two embodied agents interact across cooperative and competitive scenarios requiring integration of verbal statements, spatial trajectories, gaze direction, and facial expression under systematically varied ToM constraints. Evaluating 13 models, including 11 VLMs, across 200 trials per model, we find that VLMs fail to produce behaviors consistent with the expected outcomes under ToM-order constraints, and that imposing explicit ToM-order constraints produces no reliable behavioral change aligned with the specified reasoning level. Signal-level analysis reveals two sequential bottlenecks: most models cannot produce directionally coherent nonverbal signals, and even when signals are present, VLM agents fail to interpret others behaviors and react to them. PCM-LLM, included as a structured architectural reference point with an explicit ToM module, succeeds across all conditions, suggesting that explicit belief-action coupling is a sufficient ingredient for this class of tasks.
Do frontier vision-language models present a coherent Theory-of-Mind (ToM) profile across tasks, matching the same human reference group, or does that profile fragment from one paradigm to the next? We evaluate a shared panel of nine frontier VLMs on two psychology-derived benchmarks: the Keysar Director Task (visual perspective-taking under egocentric interference) and the Frith-Happé animated triangles scored with the Castelli rubric (intention attribution from pure motion). On the Director Task, without chain-of-thought, the panel makes the egocentric error on 78\% of trials like children rather than adults; variation is substantial across models, and reasoning rescues several models. On the triangles, the panel under-attributes intention: its ToM profile sits more than three times closer to the high-functioning-autistic-adult (HF-ASD) mean than to the typical-development-adult (TD) mean, while Goal-Directed and Random stay near TD. No model is nearest TD on both tasks; the model that looks adult-like on the Director Task falls on the HF-ASD side on the triangles, and the most TD-like model on the triangles is child-like on the Director Task. We report group-level descriptions, not diagnostic labels for any model.
Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to infer other's beliefs, intentions, and states of knowledge, is central to social interaction, yet remains challenging for current Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs), especially in multi-party meetings where cues are distributed across speech and behavior. Existing multimodal ToM benchmarks mainly focus on video-grounded question answering over overt, externally verifiable signals, and provide limited coverage of latent social states and group dynamics. We introduce MeetingToM, a benchmark for complex social behavior reasoning in naturalistic multi-party meetings. MeetingToM targets meeting-specific phenomena such as \textbf{pseudo-consensus}, where apparent agreement masks private dissent under social pressure. The benchmark is hierarchically organized to evaluate ToM at increasing levels of social granularity, including (i) subject-level mental state prediction, (ii) dyadic-level addressee understanding, and (iii) group-level consensus reasoning. We provide a unified evaluation protocol and conduct systematic analyses of representative MLLMs, revealing persistent limitations in integrating non-verbal cues, inferring hidden attitudes, and distinguishing genuine consensus from pseudo-consensus. Our results highlight key challenges and establish MeetingToM as a testbed for advancing meeting-grounded ToM in multimodal models.
True general intelligence requires not only a model of the physical world but also a social world model: the capacity to infer how individual mental states interact and crystallize into group-level outcomes. Despite notable progress in individual-level Theory of Mind (ToM) reasoning, existing multimodal large language models fail at this broader task. Collective behavior emerges non-linearly from social tensions, conformity dynamics, and structural constraints, meaning it cannot be recovered by merely summing individual intentions. We present GroupToM-Bench, the first multimodal benchmark for group-level ToM, built around a causal chain spanning micro-level BDI states (belief, desire, intention), meso-level group tension and structural constraints, and macro-level outcome prediction and mechanistic attribution. To probe this full arc, we develop a seven-level cognitive audit framework. Experiments reveal a gap between current models and human baselines, highlighting a failure to process social structures and non-linear collective dynamics.