Predicting how a population will answer a new question is a long-standing goal. Statistical methods succeed at the level of the mass but falter at the level of the individual. Large language model simulators inherit this gap. They recover a population's central tendencies while flattening its heterogeneity, and they carry social biases and prompt brittleness that distort individual predictions. This paper introduces Anacreon, an audience simulation model that targets the individual level within a narrow, well-specified domain. Anacreon learns an authorship embedding that separates individuals, clusters a real qualitative corpus around seed people, and trains a dedicated adapter for each cluster, a mixture of minds, on a Gemma~4 12B base. It harvests demographics, psychological traits, and survey responses from public text, and augments each record with a chain-of-emotion. It reduces prompt brittleness by shuffling response options and reduces positive bias by balancing the training distribution. On a large, externally sourced survey, Anacreon reaches a state-of-the-art ordinal alignment of 0.775, the individual-level accuracy measure on which the field has converged, with a small residual bias. The work is a step toward drawing aggregate insight from faithfully simulated individuals.
Sebastian Pohl, Harsh Mehta, Pranav Mambayil +4cs.CL cs.SI
LLMs are increasingly deployed as proxies for human study participants in social science experiments, yet the fidelity of this practice has rarely been tested directly. We test whether six LLMs can simulate individual human belief updates, comparing LLM outputs 1-to-1 against ground truth data from 391 UK participants on Prolific, who updated their stances on three discussion topics after reading Reddit comments. Each participant was simulated by an LLM conditioned on a persona derived from their demographic and personality trait data. We find that some LLMs (Qwen3-32B and GPT-5-Mini) can match the human post-stance distribution, but only when given participants' actual initial stances. All six models fail to simulate initial stances themselves and to produce faithful belief updates from self-generated stances. Three systematic biases emerge across all models: overrepresentation of neutral positions, more frequent but smaller belief shifts than humans, and a failure to rank comments by convincingness. Demographic and personality trait personas had no consistent effect on fidelity. LLM simulations of human belief dynamics are only reliable when grounded in realistic starting conditions, that current multi-round social media simulations rarely provide.