Large language models work well on English and behave in poorly understood ways on languages typologically far from it. Japanese is a clean example, where evaluation still leans on translation quality and JGLUE-style benchmarks, which roll lexical, syntactic and pragmatic competence into a single score. The phenomena on which general-purpose models fail Japanese users are pragmatic: honorifics, in-group and out-group reference, context-sensitive politeness, zero anaphora. I introduce J-PragEval-v0, a minimal-pair benchmark isolating four such phenomena from surface fluency, and combine it with linear probes and teacher-forced log-probability evaluation to ask where inside TinySwallow-1.5B (28 layers, hidden size 1536) the corresponding contrasts live. The four features split three ways. Honorific register sits cleanly in the residual stream: 0.96 balanced accuracy at layer 15, and the model flips its preferred continuation with the scenario on 93 percent of items. Implicit subject and in-group reference are not linearly decodable at the final prompt token (0.48 and 0.38), yet flip rates are 0.77 and 0.79, so the contrast is worked out during generation rather than stored at the prompt. Indirect refusal is the negative case: 0.95 probe accuracy collapsing to a 0.43 flip rate under length-normalised teacher forcing, because the current minimal pairs conflate politeness with continuation length. I also specify Pragmatic Representation Steering, a parameter-free inference-time method that edits residual-stream activations along the class-mean-difference directions probing identifies. Feasibility is argued indirectly rather than demonstrated: the contrastive activation addition baseline, the same geometry the method would inject, recovers probe accuracy within one to two points of logistic regression wherever a linear signal exists. Scaling to Llama-3.1-Swallow-8B is the next step.
Natural language understanding often depends on meanings that are implied rather than explicitly stated, requiring pragmatic reasoning. Despite strong performance on math and logical reasoning, large language models (LLMs) still struggle with making pragmatic inferences, often choosing literal interpretations. To improve LLM pragmatic reasoning, we introduce PragReST, a self-supervised framework that constructs pragmatic QA data, generates counterfactual reasoning traces, and trains models to internalize them through supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning, without human-labeled training data or distillation from a stronger teacher. Across four pragmatic benchmarks (PragMega, Ludwig, MetoQA, and AltPrag), PragReST improves over backbone models, task-specific pragmatic tuning baselines, and non-counterfactual variants of the same pipeline. On accuracy-based benchmarks, PragReST improves over the instruct backbone by 5.37 and 5.50% (absolute) for Qwen3-8B and Qwen3-14B, respectively. Our error analysis and ablations underscore the importance of counterfactual reasoning: PragReST primarily reduces errors caused by failures to contrast observed utterances with plausible alternatives, and removing counterfactual reasoning substantially reduces performance. Moreover, our training preserves out-of-domain performance on general-knowledge and mathematical reasoning benchmarks.
Paolo Morosi, Nikoleta Pantelidou, Fritz Günther +2cs.CL cs.AI
Humans effortlessly go beyond literal meanings: If you mow the lawn, I will give you fifty dollars, is typically understood as implying that the speaker will pay only if the lawn is mowed, whereas If you are hungry, there is pizza in the oven implies that pizza is available regardless of the hearers hunger. Large Language Models - LLMs - show human-like performance on many tasks, yet it remains unclear whether they reason like humans. To address this, we conducted a population-matching experiment assessing how twentyfive LLMs compute conditional inferences across four languages, compared to an equal number of humans per language. We find that humans enrich logical reasoning through pragmatic inferences across languages. Model behavior is more variable. Some LLMs perfectly follow the truth-table of conditionals but they ignore pragmatic inferences, while others deviate from the truth-table, adhering to a single interpretation across the board, thus reflecting accurate rule-based processing but not human-like reasoning. Overall, LLMs are accurate semantic operators, but fail to capture the pragmatic enrichments characteristic of human reasoning. Crucially, LLM accuracy is neither predicted nor boosted by open vs. closed status, training orientation, or architecture type, suggesting that pragmatic reasoning is still an emerging ability in the cognitive toolkit of artificial systems.