Sebastian Pohl, Harsh Mehta, Pranav Mambayil +4cs.CL cs.SI
LLMs are increasingly deployed as proxies for human study participants in social science experiments, yet the fidelity of this practice has rarely been tested directly. We test whether six LLMs can simulate individual human belief updates, comparing LLM outputs 1-to-1 against ground truth data from 391 UK participants on Prolific, who updated their stances on three discussion topics after reading Reddit comments. Each participant was simulated by an LLM conditioned on a persona derived from their demographic and personality trait data. We find that some LLMs (Qwen3-32B and GPT-5-Mini) can match the human post-stance distribution, but only when given participants' actual initial stances. All six models fail to simulate initial stances themselves and to produce faithful belief updates from self-generated stances. Three systematic biases emerge across all models: overrepresentation of neutral positions, more frequent but smaller belief shifts than humans, and a failure to rank comments by convincingness. Demographic and personality trait personas had no consistent effect on fidelity. LLM simulations of human belief dynamics are only reliable when grounded in realistic starting conditions, that current multi-round social media simulations rarely provide.
Eun Cheol Choi, Youngrae Kim, Prabhu Pugalenthi +2cs.CL cs.CY cs.LG
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to simulate social survey responses, yet their outputs exhibit systematic biases: marginal distributions are skewed, response variance is poorly calibrated, and predictor-outcome relationships are attenuated. We ask a simple question: given a small pilot sample of human responses, can an LLM recover the statistical characteristics of a broader population? We decompose recovery along three axes: structural fidelity, marginal fidelity, and individual fidelity. Using a COVID-19 misinformation survey as a case study, we benchmark three families of approaches: prompting, rectification, and fine-tuning. The findings suggest that fine-tuning on small pilot samples offers a balanced approach for achieving multiple forms of fidelity, but the levels of such fidelity can vary across subsamples, potentially threatening pluralistic alignment.
This position paper argues that the under-representation of social science tasks in contemporary LLM benchmarks limits advances in both LLM evaluation and social scientific inquiry. Benchmarks -- standardized tools for assessing computational systems -- are pivotal in the development of artificial intelligence (AI), including large language models (LLMs). Benchmarks do more than measure progress -- they actively structure it, shaping reputations, research agendas, and commercial outcomes. Despite this central role, the social sciences are largely absent from mainstream evaluation frameworks, even though scholars in these fields generate dozens of rigorously annotated, context-sensitive datasets each year. Integrating this work into benchmark design could significantly improve the generalization and robustness of AI models. In turn, models trained on social scientific tasks would likely yield better performance on classic and contemporary tasks in disciplines as diverse as history, sociology, political science or economics. This is all the more pressing as these disciplines are quickly turning to LLMs for assistance. To address this gap, we introduce BenCSSmark, a benchmark composed of datasets annotated by computational social scientists. By integrating social scientific perspectives into benchmarking, BenCSSmark seeks to promote more robust, transparent, and socially relevant AI systems and to foster efficient collaboration.