Optimizing Minimax Regret in Uncertain MDPs with Small Sets of Policies

Sequential decision-making in real-world applications often involves uncertainty about the environment's model. Uncertain Markov decision processes (UMDPs) represent the possible environments as a set of MDPs with shared states and actions but potentially different transition probabilities and rewards. Optimizing a single policy across all possible MDPs may sacrifice performance, while preparing an individually optimized policy for every MDP may violate operational, regulatory, or interpretability constraints on the number of policies that can be prepared and deployed. We consider settings in which model uncertainty is resolved shortly before execution, allowing the most suitable policy to be selected from a limited set prepared in advance. We introduce $k$-adaptable policy synthesis, which optimizes such a set of $k$ policies under a minimax-regret objective. We prove that the problem is NP-hard and develop KAPS, an exact nested branch-and-bound algorithm with problem-specific bounds and heuristics. KAPS jointly optimizes which MDPs share a policy and the policies themselves. Experiments across various UMDP benchmarks show that the largest reduction in regret consistently occurs when increasing from one to two policies. In the single-policy setting, KAPS is competitive with existing methods in solution quality and proves optimality substantially more often.

Price of Fairness in Bandits: A Tight Minimax Characterization

In bandit problems, standard regret-minimizing algorithms treat exploration as an amortized cost, which can expose early participants to unfair ex-ante losses in settings such as clinical trials. Recent work addresses this by evaluating the sequence of per-round expected rewards through the generalized $p$-mean, interpolating between utilitarian welfare ($p=1$), Nash welfare ($p\to0$), and Rawlsian fairness ($p\to-\infty$). Although tight guarantees are known for $p\ge0$, the strictly fair regime $q=-p>0$ remains unresolved because negative-power means are dominated by the smallest per-round rewards. For $σ$-sub-Gaussian rewards with nonnegative means, the best prior algorithm relied on uniform early exploration and achieved regret $O(k^{(q+1)/2}/\sqrt{T})$, while the only general lower bound was the classical $Ω(σ\sqrt{k/T})$. Thus it was unclear whether the extra dependence on $k$ was intrinsic to strict fairness or an artifact of uniform exploration. We close this gap by identifying the exact polynomial price of strict fairness. Using a needle-in-haystack construction, we prove an algorithm-independent lower bound $Ω(σ\sqrt{k^{\max(1,q)}/T})$; for $q>1$, this shows that the penalty $k^{q/2}$ is information-theoretically unavoidable. We then introduce \textsf{UCB-HARE} (Harmonic Anchored Rank Exploration), which replaces uniform exploration with an inverse-weighted harmonic rank schedule protected by a certified positive-mean anchor. Its regret is $\widetilde{O}(σ\sqrt{k^{\max(1,q)}/T})$, matching the lower bound up to logarithmic factors. Experiments on synthetic instances confirm that \textsf{UCB-HARE} improves over uniform-exploration baselines, with gains increasing as $q$ grows.

Beyond Bayesian Nash: Learning Minimax-Regret Equilibria for Adversarial Team Games under Asymmetric Information

Adversarial team games (ATGs) with asymmetric information, such as adversarial path-finding, goal search, and reachability games on graphs, require strategies that are robust to hidden opponent types, such as a hidden goal flag, and to deception. Under asymmetric information, deception is seen as strategic shifts in the type distribution such that the omniscient opponent can collude with Nature and condition its play on the observed type. Existing risk-neutral solution concepts, such as Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE), are sensitive to distribution shifts, while distributionally robust approaches provide guarantees only within a prescribed ambiguity set. To address these limitations, we introduce Probabilistically Robust Minimax-Regret Equilibrium (PR-MRE), a novel equilibrium concept that combines the distribution-free robustness of minimax-regret reasoning with probabilistic information from a nominal type distribution. PR-MRE minimizes worst-case regret over a high-confidence subset of the type space, providing protection against strategic redistribution of probability mass while avoiding the conservatism of fully distribution-free approaches. We show that, for normal-form Bayesian games, PR-MRE can be formulated as a robust bilinear program and derive a tractable semidefinite relaxation. We then adapt this relaxation into a novel meta-solver within a robust double-oracle framework, PRMRE-PSRO, enabling population-based learning of approximate PR-MRE strategies via deep reinforcement learning best responses. Experiments on graph-structured adversarial team games demonstrate that PR-MRE discovers strategies with substantially improved worst-case performance across hidden types compared to risk-neutral equilibrium solutions, resulting in more robust behavior under strategic distribution shifts.