Tracing sources of epistemic uncertainty in deep learning predictions: homo- and hetero-scedastic linearized estimators

We adapt two classical statistical estimators for quantifying uncertainty to modern deep learning, in order to provide clearer insights into uncertainty attributable to two sources : aleatoric uncertainty, or locally scarce data. Our approach leverages recent advances in approximate Fisher Information Matrices, to enable scaling to actual architectures. Experimental results demonstrate how each test points is differentially impacted by both sources, highlighting the practical utility of our estimators in improving the robustness of real-world applications.

A Unified Risk View of Uncertainty: Posterior Risk for Disentanglement and Evaluation Beyond Proxies

Reliable uncertainty estimates are critical in safety-sensitive applications, where understanding the sources of predictive uncertainty is essential. This often requires disentangling epistemic uncertainty from aleatoric uncertainty, yet these uncertainty types are not defined consistently across the literature, making it difficult to assess whether a method produces accurate uncertainty estimates. Evaluation is further complicated by the fact that ground-truth epistemic uncertainty is typically unavailable. Existing benchmarks therefore mostly rely on proxy tasks such as out-of-distribution detection, which do not provide complete ground-truth uncertainty targets and offer limited insight into the structure and quality of uncertainty estimates. We propose a unified definition of uncertainty as pointwise posterior risk, the expected loss of a predictor under the distribution of plausible ground-truth functions given the data. This view combines Bayesian uncertainty over functions with estimator-dependent deviations from the posterior mean, capturing effects such as misspecification and optimization error. This formulation constitutes the foundation of a theory-backed benchmark that enables direct computation of oracle epistemic and aleatoric uncertainty using semi-synthetic datasets with real covariates and known generative processes. By avoiding proxy evaluations, the benchmark enables fine-grained analysis of uncertainty estimates. Empirically, we find that accurate prediction does not guarantee reliable uncertainty disentanglement. The benchmark reveals practically useful differences between methods, identifying approaches with meaningful alignment to oracle uncertainty targets while exposing sensitivity to datasets and modeling choices.

Subjective Risk Decomposition: A New View for Uncertainty Quantification

We present a novel viewpoint for uncertainty quantification. Uncertainty measures are not primitives, in need of axioms and argumentation, but instead consequences, of higher-level modelling decisions. We show how epistemic and aleatoric uncertainty measures can be derived via decomposition of a subjective risk, based on a strictly proper loss. Reverse cross-entropy provides a prominent example, where decomposition recovers the classic information-theoretic uncertainty terms. The same approach recovers numerous measures previously proposed across the UQ literature, providing them a common theoretical foundation. From a practical point of view, this suggests a new approach to UQ: given a modelling scenario and strictly proper loss, the corresponding epistemic and aleatoric terms are induced by the subjective-risk decomposition. We then extend our view to learning theory: we introduce and analyse subjective risk analogues of excess risk, approximation error, and estimation error, and identify the connections to UQ. We consider this a first step towards a full learning-theoretic framework for uncertainty quantification.

Evaluating Epistemic Uncertainty: Beyond OOD Detection and Active Learning

Current evaluation of epistemic uncertainty relies on tasks such as out-ofdistribution detection and active learning. However, the Bayes-optimal decision strategies for these tasks do not coincide with the scores commonly used to quantify epistemic uncertainty. Building on the epistemic reject-option framework, we evaluate epistemic uncertainty using its ability to identify regret, the reducible error. Formulating selective prediction as a constrained optimization over coverage, expected risk, and regret, we prove the optimal selector is a thresholded convex combination of the ground-truth aleatoric and epistemic uncertainties. This theoretical unification exposes a weakness in recent uncertainty disentanglement literature: we demonstrate that standard correlation metrics between learned components do not necessarily predict their actual operational utility. We instead propose to evaluate the achievable risk, regret, coverage surface of the decomposition as a diagnostic for joint disentanglement and utility. Benchmarking standard methods on datasets with dense human annotations reveals that decision-theoretic rankings can disagree substantially with proxy-task rankings, including pairwise rank inversions between methods that are top-ranked on one criterion and bottom-ranked on other.

Heckman-Corrected Epistemic Uncertainty: Selection on Unobservables Defeats Importance Weighting

Training data for machine learning is routinely collected by a selection process the model never sees: loans are observed only when granted, outcomes only when a test was ordered. The standard fixes -- importance weighting, covariate-shift correction, MAR imputation -- assume selection is ignorable given observables. Econometrics solved the harder case in 1979: Heckman's two-equation model jointly fits a probit selection equation and an outcome equation linked through correlated errors, and the inverse-Mills-ratio term corrects for selection on unobservables, where importance weighting is structurally helpless. We instantiate this for deep epistemic uncertainty: a deep outcome network, a linear selection head, and a joint bivariate-normal likelihood over all units, ensembled for predictive variance. In a controlled generator where sampling probability depends on an unobservable correlated (rho up to 0.9) with the outcome noise, deep ensembles, MC dropout, and GP baselines are overconfident exactly where data was avoided: coverage of nominal-90% intervals falls to 64.4% at rho=0.9, and importance weighting with oracle propensities does not fix it (43.1%) -- reweighting corrects the covariate distribution, not the conditional bias E[y|x,selected] != E[y|x]. The Heckman correction restores coverage (88.9%) when the selection equation has an instrument -- a variable affecting selection but not the outcome -- and degrades measurably without one (40.3%); we chart this honesty curve rather than hide it. On real tabular data with induced MNAR selection, the corrected intervals are the best-calibrated (lowest region-ECE) non-oracle method in selected-against regions; baselines matching its raw coverage do so only by over-widening everywhere. Our estimators reproduce classic Stata output to seven digits. We state which identification regime a practitioner is in, and release the code.

Exposure Bias as Epistemic Underidentification in Recursive Forecasting

Recursive multi-step forecasting is usually framed as distribution shift: models are trained on observed histories but deployed on their own predictions. We show this framing is incomplete by proving that, under partial observability or state truncation, recursive rollout is also an epistemic underidentification problem. Even with deterministic latent dynamics, one-step Bayes supervision identifies behavior only on observed contexts and need not identify the deployed recursive predictor once rollout queries self-generated induced states whose correct local targets are not determined by numeric state alone. We formalize this with induced states $Z$ and provenance variables $P$, and derive a decomposition of induced-state error into teacher-forcing/rollout mismatch, representation--class approximation, and provenance information gaps. Empirically, we show that rollout enters a distinct induced-state regime, that fixed induced states define a distinct local corrective task, and that closed-loop gains arise not only from local adaptation but also from changing the induced states visited during rollout. Using a simple binary provenance encoding, provenance-aware correction can further improve performance, though gains are conditional rather than uniform. These results recast exposure bias as reasoning under self-induced epistemic uncertainty.

Epistemic Uncertainty Is Not the Reducible Kind

The standard taxonomy of predictive uncertainty defines epistemic uncertainty as the part removable by collecting more data, while the standard measure identifies it with a mutual-information term. We prove the definition and the measure are extensionally inconsistent. On an explicit construction, the measure assigns all uncertainty to the epistemic class, yet no quantity of training data reduces it. Reducibility is instead a property of the pair (uncertainty, acquisition class), and the dichotomy resolves into three parts: aleatoric, sample-reducible epistemic, and mechanism-reducible epistemic uncertainty. An exact identity for the value of an observation shows that in-distribution data never reduces mechanism-irreducible uncertainty and generically increases it. Ensemble disagreement, the deployed epistemic estimate, tracks the training procedure rather than the epistemic term. It collapses to zero beneath a positive truth under consistent training, and equals hyperparameter-scaled initialization noise under interpolation. A finite-sample falsification test and seed-swept experiments confirm the theory.

What Uncertainties Do We Need for Dynamical Systems?

The distinction between aleatoric and epistemic uncertainty has received considerable attention in machine learning research, mainly in the context of supervised learning but also in other settings such as generative modeling. In this paper, we offer a machine learning perspective on uncertainty modeling for dynamical systems, which has been studied much less so far. In particular, we ask: what uncertainties do we need for dynamical systems? We discuss sources of uncertainty, clarify their nature (aleatoric or epistemic), and consider how the objectives of representing and quantifying uncertainty vary across different tasks.

Can we trust our models? Epistemic calibration in second-order classification

Uncertainty estimation is critical for deploying machine learning models in high-stakes settings. However, classical calibration only assesses the reliability of predicted probabilities and does not evaluate whether epistemic uncertainty estimates are themselves trustworthy. This limitation is particularly relevant for second-order classification models. We introduce epistemic calibration, a principled criterion that measures whether reported epistemic uncertainty faithfully reflects the dispersion of model predictions around the ground truth. We show that epistemic calibration is a strictly stronger notion than classical calibration and captures failure modes invisible to standard metrics. We relate this work to the existing literature through an impossibility theorem that holds under the epistemic calibration hypothesis. To operationalize this concept, we propose the Expected Epistemic Calibration Error (EECE), which we prove to be a consistent estimator of a True Epistemic Calibration Error (TECE). Experiments across a broad range of uncertainty quantification methods show that epistemic calibration is a coherent and meaningful criterion and reveal substantial differences across methods, despite similar predictive performance.

Credal Concept Bottleneck Models for Epistemic-Aleatoric Uncertainty Decomposition

Concept Bottleneck Models (CBMs) predict through human-interpretable concepts, but they typically output point concept probabilities that conflate epistemic uncertainty (reducible model underspecification) with aleatoric uncertainty (irreducible input ambiguity). This makes concept-level uncertainty hard to interpret and, more importantly, hard to act upon. We introduce CREDENCE (Credal Ensemble Concept Estimation), a CBM framework that decomposes concept uncertainty by construction. CREDENCE represents each concept as a credal prediction (a probability interval), derives epistemic uncertainty from disagreement across diverse concept heads, and estimates aleatoric uncertainty via a dedicated ambiguity output trained to match annotator disagreement when available. The resulting signals support prescriptive decisions: automate low-uncertainty cases, prioritize data collection for high-epistemic cases, route high-aleatoric cases to human review, and abstain when both are high. Across several tasks, we show that epistemic uncertainty is positively associated with prediction errors, whereas aleatoric uncertainty closely tracks annotator disagreement, providing guidance beyond error correlation. Our implementation is available at the following link: https://github.com/Tankiit/Credal_Sets/tree/ensemble-credal-cbm