Paradoxes of Game Theoretic Equilibria and Price of Anarchy

For decades, static solution concepts (Nash, Correlated, and Coarse Correlated Equilibria) and the Price of Anarchy (PoA) have formed the bedrock of algorithmic game theory, with no-regret learning proving fast convergence to such game-theoretic equilibria. We show that reducing multi-agent learning to static equilibrium and black-box regret analysis obscures underlying dynamic disequilibrium and game theoretic bounds. First, interior Nash equilibria lack $C^1$ vector field information, meaning agents cannot distinguish aligned from strictly opposing incentives. Inheriting this geometry, the worst-case pure Nash equilibria dictating robust PoA bounds manifest as topologically unstable strict saddles, and in canonical congestion games, as global repellers supported on almost everywhere strictly dominated strategies. Anchoring efficiency guarantees to these unstable states causes algebraic sensitivity; we prove that accommodating all strictly positive affine costs renders the PoA unbounded. Furthermore, projecting learning trajectories onto the discrete simplex of correlated play systematically accommodates non-rationalizable behavior. Evaluating dynamics via Coarse Correlated Equilibria or proximal refinements fails to preclude strictly dominated strategies. Moreover, optimal $O(1/T)$ swap-regret minimization does not preclude macroscopic turbulence, manifesting as chaotic limit sets even in minimal games. Finally, we examine the non-atomic limit of congestion games. Though considered highly stable with tight sub-linear $Θ(p/\ln p)$ PoA bounds (where $p$ is the polynomial degree), we prove that under discrete-time learning, the unique equilibrium destabilizes into Li-Yorke chaos and global attractors whose time-averaged inefficiency degrades exponentially as $2^p$. These results necessitate re-evaluating worst-case equilibrium frameworks for dynamically grounded metrics.

Large-Step Training Dynamics of a Two-Factor Linear Transformer Model

Gradient-flow analyses show that simplified linear transformers can learn the in-context linear-regression algorithm, but they do not explain the finite-step behavior of gradient descent at large learning rates. Motivated by empirical work on high-learning-rate transformer instabilities and by the cubic-map phase diagram for quadratic regression, we study an exactly reducible one-prompt linear-transformer training problem. After normalization, the dynamics reduce to a two-factor product map with an effective step-size parameter \(μ\). On the balanced slice, this map recovers the known scalar cubic transition from monotone convergence to catapult convergence, periodic and chaotic bounded nonconvergence, and divergence. We then analyze the full two-dimensional system and show that, for \(0<μ<2\), it has an explicit invariant Chebyshev ellipse separating forward-invariant regions; this ellipse carries off-balanced chaotic dynamics but is transversely repelling, while balanced scalar attractors can be transversely attracting. These results show that large constant learning rates can change the training attractor of the learned transformer rather than merely accelerating convergence: beyond sharp stability thresholds, finite-step training may settle into cycles, bounded chaos, or divergence instead of a single in-context linear-regression solution. We also discuss the consequences for mini-batch gradient descent based training methods.