We revisit the regret loss framework introduced in Park et al. (2025), which uses decision-theoretic regret as a direct loss function for training models to make better decisions, through the lens of probability-simplex policies. Our first result shows that a single-layer self-attention model trained with regret loss admits a stationary point whose forward-pass exactly matches smoothed fictitious play with the appropriate stepsize that ensures no-regret behavior-i.e., for any given policy input, the model outputs the same update that smoothed fictitious play would produce. In parallel, we also newly introduce a swap-regret loss function, which extends the regret-loss framework beyond external regret and enables models to directly optimize for swap-deviation robustness. We further show that this swap-regret loss admits a stationary point whose forward pass implements the corresponding swap-regret update induced by classical Blum-Mansour no-pass implementation algorithm, with each head implementing an external-regret update via smoothed fictitious play. Together, these results show that regret-trained attention can realize differentiable mechanisms whose deployment induces equilibrium behavior in games: external-regret dynamics lead to coarse correlated equilibrium, while swap-regret dynamics lead to correlated equilibrium. Thus, regret-based objectives steer minimal attention architectures toward online-learning dynamics with game-theoretic guarantees, without supervised traces of those algorithms.
Power grids, markets, and interacting populations, settle into feedback driven equilibria observed through unknown sensors. Our Equilibrium Causal Game (ECG) joins a game to its cyclic causal model, hidden inputs, sensor map, and rules for interventions and equilibrium selection; interventions edit declared objects and recompute equilibrium. Under stated conditions, ECG-separation is sound but incomplete in our examples. Back-door/half-trek routes identify observed queries. Yet for an untouched rotationally symmetric Gaussian block, second moments determine only a source-frame rotation, across which distinct-variable effects generically change. Unknown sensing creates a separate ambiguity. In passive stable linear models without self-effects, unknown wiring and full-rank unknown sensing leave $B$ completely unidentified for $d\ge2$. Under LiNG, non-Gaussianity removes the source rotation; mechanism interventions separate sensing from interactions. With unknown support, invariant sensing, aligned responses, and well-posed single-target interventions identify $(H,B)$ up to declared equivalence. Of $d$ targets, $d-1$ suffice exactly when the sole untargeted node directly parents all others; otherwise $d$ are needed. Acquisition probes are excluded; known wiring gives no universal count. With nonlinear sensing, isotropic Gaussian source blocks admit hidden twists within and across blocks in labelled environments preserving required radial laws. Conversely, under stated positivity, informative one-block changes, rank, and irreducibility conditions, the finest independent source-block representation is identified within the stated alternative class up to block permutation and blockwise coordinate changes, but not downstream mechanisms or the sensor/interaction split. Together, these results show which causal conclusions equilibrium data support and which require targeted experiments.
External regret certifies stability only against replacing one's behavior by a fixed alternative. In a quantum game, this misses a natural physical move: a player can apply a local completely positive trace-preserving (CPTP) map to the state it actually received or prepared. We introduce coherent swap regret as the regret benchmark against all such local CPTP deviations, and give an algorithm achieving $O(\sqrt{dT\log d})$ coherent swap regret via entropic mirror ascent on the CPTP Choi slice with a fixed-point play rule. The main result is a three-level deviation-class landscape. Replacement channels recover ordinary external regret at rate $Θ(\sqrt{T\log d})$. Unital channels, including unitary deviations and mixtures of unitaries, have zero minimax regret. Deterministic measurement-and-preparation channels already force $Ω(\sqrt{dT\log d})$ regret in the moderate-horizon regime, and this rate is also sufficient for all CPTP deviations. Thus the hardness comes from non-unital use of the recommendation register, not from quantum coherence alone. As an application, decentralized full-information learning in finite quantum games reaches an $\varepsilon$-approximate separable quantum correlated equilibrium after $T=O(\max_i d_i\log d_i/\varepsilon^2)$ rounds. We identify these equilibria with channel-proofness of mediated quantum recommendation protocols, give an SDP audit for local CPTP exploitability applicable to arbitrary finite-dimensional states, and include a probing-bandit extension with pseudo-regret $O(d^{4/3}T^{2/3}(\log d)^{1/3})$ under Haar-random pure-state probes.