Decision-Focused Learning in Network Interdiction Games

We study decision-focused learning (DFL) in shortest-path network interdiction (SPNI) games, a Stackelberg game where an interdictor (leader) strengthens the networks' arcs against attacks, while an evader (follower) who is uncertain about costs of attacking network arcs relies on a machine-learned predictor to identify the shortest path. While DFL is highly effective as an end-to-end optimization framework, we show that it faces a fundamental structural failure when employed in this game setting: its training objective admits a broad decision-equivalence class of cost estimators that achieve zero nominal loss yet fail under interdiction, reversing DFL's usual advantage over a naive prediction-focused learning (PFL) approach. To address this, we propose Adversarial DFL (A-DFL), which replaces nominal training samples with interdicted scenarios to collapse the harmful equivalence class. Experiments on synthetic and real-world networks confirm that A-DFL restores DFL's advantage in this game setting, enabling effective end-to-end optimization.

Homogenization of $\ell_2$-Adversarial Training in High-Dimensions: Exact Dynamics under Stochastic Gradient Descent

We develop a framework for analyzing the learning dynamics of $\ell_2$-adversarial training of single-index models on Gaussian mixtures in the high-dimensional limit under streaming stochastic gradient descent (SGD). We derive deterministic equivalents for a broad class of statistics of the SGD iterates, including the adversarial risk and distance to adversarial optimality, in terms of the solution to a system of ODEs. We use them to study two idealized learning rate schedules: the Polyak stepsize and exact line search. In the case of $\ell_2$-adversarial least squares with a single class, we show that, unlike noiseless standard least squares, no constant learning rate guarantees monotone descent of SGD towards a minimizer of the adversarial risk. We identify anisotropic covariance and a mismatch in ridge parameters as the main sources of suboptimality of exact line search relative to the Polyak stepsize. We also introduce a stochastic differential equation (SDE), called adversarial homogenized SGD, that captures the evolution of statistics of the iterates of SGD. For $\ell_2$-adversarial least squares, using this SDE, we show the evolution of the risk is equivalent, up to dimension-free constants, to that of SGD on standard least squares with an adaptive learning rate and adaptive $\ell_2$-regularization. When the dynamics converge, the limiting adversarial risk and SGD iterate are determined by a fixed-point equation, with the limiting iterate being equivalent to the solution of a ridge regression problem whose regularization parameter is the limiting effective regularization of SGD.